Duty of care, safety, normalisation and the Mental Capacity Act:a discourse analysis of staff arguments about facilitating choices for people with learning disabilities in UK services by Jingree, Treena
1	  
	  
Duty of Care, Safety, Normalisation and The Mental Capacity Act: A Discourse 
Analysis of Staff Arguments about Facilitating Choices for People with Learning 
Disabilities in UK Services 
 
Keywords: Learning Disabilities, Discourse Analysis, Choice, Empowerment, 
Mental Capacity Act. 
2	  
	  
Abstract 
The benefits of having choice and control for people with learning disabilitiesi are 
well documented and front-line carers often make efforts ensuring that these are 
facilitated.  However despite this, Government policy reports that disempowerment 
within learning disability services in the United Kingdom is a persistent problem.  
Using critical discursive psychology, 15 interviews with support-workers about 
empowering people with learning disabilities were analysed. Interpretative repertoires 
about ‘duty of care,’ ‘safety’ and ‘normalisation’ and discursive strategies involving 
‘comparative evaluations’ were found, which opened speaker positions of granting or 
withholding choice, assuming responsibility for those in care and constructing 
service-users as lacking capacity.  These resources also allowed speakers to regulate 
the choices of service-users and to normalise limited choice in ways which 
undermined taking up more empowering practices. The findings may explain the 
persistence of disempowerment within services by indicating how such discourses are 
deeply entrenched in service talk and are invoked to justify disempowering practices.  
This is discussed in view of the implications for empowerment and also current 
legislative frameworks such as the Mental Capacity Act.  
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Introduction 
For people with learning disabilities, having control over one’s life significantly 
enhances domestic and community participation and decreases challenging 
behaviours and depression (Stancliffe et al, 2010).  Yet, forty years following the 
white paper, ‘Better Services for the Mentally Handicapped,’ (Department of Health 
(DoH, 1971), which called for improvements based on principles of normalisation 
(Wolfensberger, 1972), this group continue to be marginalised, segregated and 
disempowered (Stainton, 2000, Goodley, 2000).  More recently, there have been 
moves to facilitate inclusion.  Underpinned by values of empowerment, 
individualisation and personalisation and enshrined in White Papers such as ‘Valuing 
People’ (DoH, 2001; 2009), these have called for ways to enable people to take 
control of their lives by making real choices and having their preferences recognised.   
As part of policy objectives to facilitate choices and control, the Mental 
Capacity Act (MCA) Code of Practice (2005) provides a legal framework for 
decision-making in services where users may lack capacity.  It proposes five 
principles where carers are advised to 1. assume a person has capacity unless 
established otherwise; 2. take all practicable steps to assist individuals in making their 
own decisions; 3.  invoke the unwise decision principle where ‘a person is not to be 
treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise decision’ (p. 
19); 4. ensure that decisions made for individuals lacking capacity are in their best 
interests and; 5. ensure that decisions made for persons lacking capacity are least 
restrictive of their rights and freedoms.  Such a framework protects individuals from 
discrimination by ‘creating a legal presumption in favour of capacity’ (Wilner, 
Jenkins, Rees, Griffiths and John, 2011; p. 159).  Nonetheless, studies suggest gaps in 
knowledge about its implementation, both in highly trained professionals of learning 
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disability services (Wilner et al, 2011), and in support-workers from residential 
settings (Dunn, Clare and Holland, 2010).   
The proposals made in ‘Valuing People’ (DoH, 2001) suggests that 
empowerment may be facilitated by targeting e.g. housing, employment, 
relationships, health and introducing initiatives such as independent living, person-
centred planning and direct payments.  However, without clear interpretation there is 
much disagreement amongst professionals, carers and family-members (Jingee and 
Finlay, 2012) over how this may be achieved.  Indeed, Forbat (2006) examined the 
hopes of policy-makers and experts on ‘Valuing People’ (DoH, 2001) and identified 
gaps between policy and its implementation.  Jingree and Finlay (2008) examined 
support-worker arguments about facilitating empowerment in their day-to-day work.  
They found speakers dilemmatically undermined service agendas to facilitate choices 
by privileging practical obstacles.   
Emancipatory values also underpin models of person-centred care such as 
‘Active Support,’ which has been found to increase choices of service-users in many 
domains (Beadle-Brown, Hutchinson and Whelton, 2012) by shifting care-taking 
away from pragmatic tasks and placing control in the hands of service-users (Mansell 
et al, 2002).  However, there has been little uptake of this as it conflicts with staff 
values and other more prioritised work (Mansell et al, 2002).  Beadle-Brown et al 
(2012) suggest more examination of the motivational contexts and leadership 
practices is needed to promote such models.  Thus, though the facilitation of choices 
and control are treated in learning disability policy as straightforward goals, in 
practice, they are difficult to implement, conflicting with other agendas and values 
within the service as well as with how support-workers strive to accomplish a high 
standard of work (Finlay, Antaki and Walton, 2008a).   
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These Government documents, therefore, minimise other concerns that carers 
may have.  Indeed, such conflicts of negotiating practical dilemmas when 
implementing empowerment policies into the care of people with learning disabilities 
are also supported by studies examining naturalistic micro-interactions between 
service-users who pay for their support via direct payments (Williams, 2011).  They 
are also observable in interactions between service-users and supporters within 
residential care homes (e.g. Antaki et al 2006; Finlay Antaki and Walton, 2008b; 
Jingree, Finlay and Antaki, 2006) and within advocacy meetings (Redley and 
Weinberg, 2007). Redley and Weinberg (2007), for instance, report that though 
structural mandates ensure that individuals are given voice in venues such as 
advocacy meetings, these fail when supporters are faced with the interactional 
impairments of those they support.  Supporters often resort to more restrictive ‘old’ 
pedagogical practices to compensate, which has the effect of undermining service-
users’ right to speak, advise and to hold onto the discursive floor (see also Bartlett and 
Bunning, 1997).  Similar problems have been identified within residential services, 
however, here, these restrictive practices have been attributed to an imbalance of 
power between support-workers and people with learning disabilities, produced by 
support-workers ascribing ‘incompetent’ identities onto the individuals they support 
and treating their contributions as unrealistic and unreliable (Antaki et al, 2006; 
Jingree et al, 2006).  
These studies are useful in revealing that despite mandates to empower people 
with learning disabilities, there continues to be obstacles in practice.  This analysis 
builds on previous research by focussing on how support-workers argue about 
empowering service-users with learning disabilities and manage dilemmas of 
facilitating independence, choices and control against other institutional agendas.   
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Method 
Staff 
Twelve female support-workers and three male support-workers participated in the 
study.  All were white British, between the ages of 22 and 59 (mean age 43.13) and 
employed by the service (a trust providing residential and day support for people with 
learning disabilities and epilepsy) for between 4 months and 19 years (mean 
employment period 8.85 years). The participants were asked to specifically speak 
about service-users with learning disabilities.  
The Interview  
This study observed ethical recommendations of the British Psychological Society.  
The data consisted of audio recordings of 15 semi-structured interviews. These 
focussed on seven topics (finance, health, diet, employment, housing, alcohol, social 
and sexual relationships), chosen by reviewing literature and government policy about 
empowering people with learning disabilities, which captured ‘Valuing People’s’ 
(DoH, 2001) central themes.  To ensure a relaxed environment, interviews were 
conducted at the service where all interviewees worked.	  	  	  An 
interventionist/confrontative style of interviewing was adopted where many 
interpretative contexts were generated by revisiting the issue of empowerment under 
each topic described above, allowing accounting practices and their functions in talk 
to emerge (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).  
The interview started with a general warm up section (e.g. “How would you 
describe the people you work with who have learning disabilities?”), before 
introducing the seven topics at relevant points in the interview.   Beginning with 
open-ended questions (e.g. diet- “How much control do you think someone with 
learning disabilities should have over what they eat?”), topics became more focused 
7	  
	  
by using prompts when required e.g. (“How about if they were diabetic or seriously 
overweight?” “Why?”). Semi-structured interviewing allowed for unexpected topics 
to be pursued further. 
Transcription and Analysis 
All interviews lasted 60-90 minutes and were transcribed verbatim, including features 
e.g. overlaps in speech (indicated as [) and large pauses (indicated as (-)).  All 
identifying names and locations were changed. The data was analysed using critical 
discursive psychology (Edley, 2001; Potter and Wetherell, 1987, Wetherell, 1998; & 
Wetherell, Taylor and Yates, 2001) whereby transcripts were repeatedly read in a 
manner mindful of the interpretative repertoires being drawn on to explain and justify 
how choice and control were promoted or restricted. Attention was also paid to the 
identities emerging from various discourses engaged in and the functions performed 
by these. The analysis, therefore involved an examination of micro-rhetorical devices 
and a global consideration of the interpretative repertoires being invoked (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987).   
 
Analysis 
Interpretative repertoires about ‘duty of care’ were found in all interviews about 
facilitating choices and control of service-users and produced staff positions of 
granting and withholding choice, and being responsible. They also justified 
positioning service-users as lacking capacity.  Within these, some speakers also 
invoked repertoires about ‘safety’ and ‘normalisation’ with powerful implications for 
facilitating choices. 
1. Duty of Care 
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Below, ‘duty of care’ repertoires position service-users as unaware of risk and lacking 
capacity, allowing Martha to justify her argument about overruling rights and choices.   
Extract 1 Martha (Lines from the original transcript 491-542) 
M And that you know I think in some cases that has 
got to override rights and choices.  (Few lines 
omitted for clarity).  Is you know is this very 
fine delign (-) line between giving the residents 
rights and choices and our duty of care. 
R Umm 
M And you know you you are walking a a tight-rope a 
lot of the time. 
R Umm 
M We’re obviously trying to give residents as much 
rights and choices as possible.  (-) But by the 
same token you do not want them taking any 
unacceptable risks. 
R Umm 
M Because not because taking unacceptable risks is 
wrong, but that because they are not aware of 
those risks.   
R Yeah.  Would you feel the same if erm it it were 
a person without learning disabilities taking 
risks, who wasn’t in your care? 
M Erm, in what way?  I mean they would then be 
aware of the risk so that wouldn’t be the issue 
it’s the awareness of the risk, not the risk 
itself if you see what I mean? 
R Yeah 
M If erm somebody without learning disabilities who 
wasn’t in my care but was aware of the risk 
wanted to go bungee-jumping without a bungee 
the(h)n okay [you just get on with it. 
R              [huh 
R Umm 
M But if it was one of my residents who really 
didn’t realise that bungee-jumping without a 
bungee was going to end in death  
R Umm 
M Then I’m sorry you know I would feel that my duty 
of ca(h)re would be such that I’d have to, (-) in 
that circumstances do something really 
stro(h)ngly 
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Martha begins by asserting ‘I think in some cases that has got to override rights 
and choices.’  She also creates a binary between rights and choices and her duty of 
care, positioning them in opposition by dividing them with a ‘fine-line’ or ‘tight-rope.’  
Using a disclaimer, (‘we’re obviously trying to give residents as much choice as 
possible.  (-) But,’), which positions her as facilitating choices, she nonetheless 
constructs a criterion based on what she describes as ‘unacceptable risk,’ where she 
argues that choices are not possible if individuals are unaware of risk.  In doing so she 
produces a blanket construction of all service-users lacking capacity (‘They are not 
aware of these risks’).  Indeed, notice how this develops.  A contrast structure is 
introduced by the interviewer, asking Martha to consider what she has just said in light 
of someone not in her care.  Here, Martha furnishes this contrast, stating that someone 
not in her care would have capacity or awareness of risks.  Next she generates an 
extreme, ridiculous case (see Jingree and Finlay, 2008) to strongly justify her 
argument, and construct people in her care as lacking capacity by inferring that if left 
to manage their own rights and choices, service-users would be ‘bungee-jumping 
without a bungee.’  This again invokes her duty of care, positioning her as ‘forced’ to 
take responsibility, ‘I would feel that my duty of care would be such that I’d have to.’  
‘Duty of care’ is an important priority.  However, it powerfully positions carers as 
compelled to intervene. Indeed, in this context, carers rarely orientated to alternative 
frameworks or to recommendations in the MCA (2005) Code of Practice, which calls 
for individuals being supported to have assumed capacity unless ascertained 
otherwise. 
In the following two extracts ‘duty of care’ repertoires are invoked together 
with repertoires resembling principles of normalisation to justify manipulating service-
user choices.  Normalisation was first defined as, ‘letting the mentally retarded (sic) 
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obtain an existence as close to normal as possible,’ (Bank Mikkelson, 1969; cited in 
Wolfensberger, 1972, p. 27).  It	  may now be considered an outdated and largely 
contested ideology by emancipatory models of disability.  However, approximately 
30% of the speakers drew on these repertoires to justify managing and guiding 
service-user choices. 
2. Duty of Care and Normalising Choice 
Below, Claire produces an account about a service-user making an unusual choice.  
Normalisation repertoires are advanced to justify regulating his choices by ‘letting 
him know the consequences’ of his actions.   
Extract 2 Claire (Lines from original transcript 826-840)
C  I’ve got somebody who just loves to dress up and come 
November he wants to go to college dressed as Father 
Christmas. (-) Now he’s at college with normal 
teenagers, who can be quite (grimaces) can’t they?  
R Umm 
C Erm so you say to him, ‘well ok, (-) you look a Pratt. 
But, if you want to wear that that’s fine, these are 
the consequences, people are gonna laugh at you, people 
are gonna do this.’  I don’t say ‘get that off and put 
something sensi,’ I can’t say that, their rights and 
choices, but I let him know the consequences of what 
ee’s going ta, what could happen! He’ll still say ‘no 
no no no,’ and then come back.  
 
Claire describes this service-user as making an inappropriate decision.  Her 
opening utterance, ‘I’ve got someone,’ instead of ‘I know someone,’ evidences her 
duty of care to him, and objectifies him as a recipient of care, whilst permitting her 
interference.  However, importantly this intervention seems motivated by outdated 
principles of normalisation.  
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Claire begins by describing this service-user in a way that corresponds with 
Wolfensberger’s (1972), depiction of ‘the deviant as an object of ridicule’ (p. 23)ii. 
She reinforces this by drawing a contrast-structure with ‘normal teenagers who can be 
quite…’ (perhaps less tolerant). Additionally, she expresses explicit disapproval for 
this service-user’s choice (an action permitted by her ‘duty of care’), ‘you look a 
Pratt’, which positions him as lacking capacity and in need of intervention.  
Nonetheless, using a three-part show concession (Antaki and Wetherell, 1999), she is 
also careful to mention that she does not wish to remove his rights and choices ‘I 
don’t say “get that off and put something sensi”, I can’t say that, their rights and 
choices, whilst simultaneously stating ‘these are the consequences...but I let him know 
the consequences’.  Such strategies resemble Wolfensberger’s (1972) 
recommendations for pedagogy and persuasion by presenting discouraging outcomes.  
They are also constructed as vivid formulations (people are gonna laugh at you), 
providing listeners with definite outcomes, and, vague formulations (people are gonna 
do this), which are difficult to challenge (Wetherell and Potter, 1992).  Both strategies 
are tailored to dissuade.  
Below, Harvey has similarly been invoking repertoires about ‘duty of care’ to 
build significant disapproval about how a service-user (Danny) personalises his 
walking-frame.  Again, practices underpinned by models of normalisation are 
observed.  Like Claire above, efforts to persuade Danny are not presented as forceful, 
controlling or even successful (Harvey-‘ I can see what he’s trying to do and we do 
try and tailor that to make him more socially acceptable’), thus allowing Harvey to 
simultaneously honour institutional obligations of respecting choices.  Nonetheless, 
the very act of ‘offering’ and ‘respecting’ choice, means that power belongs to those 
with a ‘duty of care’ (see Dowson, 1997).  The conversation continues below. 
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  Extract 3 Harvey (Lines 932-957 from original transcript)
H  Erm so yeah he’s quite a lot of work needed to get 
here. I mean he’s actually taken all the rubbish 
off his trolley now erm not that we said it was 
rubbish but because we explained that he came back 
one day and was very upset that people, kids in the 
street had stopped him and laughed ok.   
R Oh 
H and he was really [cut up  
R               [Umm 
H and crying about it. And so we was explaining “yes 
is why though Danny because, (-) they have not seen 
anyone else ever (-) pushing a trolley that looks 
like that”  
R Umm 
H Ok it makes you unique. I mean everyone does that 
themselves I mean personally my thing is doing up 
my car. So I’ve put all shiny bits on my car and 
things like that. Erm (-) I don’t go too far, was 
trying to define for him what would be you know 
socially acceptable as it were. Erm and did come 
through through to him in the end. On his own that 
perhaps action man was er a bit you know past his 
age limit (R Yeah) and so he took the rest of his 
stuff off his trolley. Erm (-) so yeah slight 
progress we will get there in the end. 
 
This extract follows a very negative description of Danny’s judgment about 
personalising his walking frame (not shown), which again parallels Wolfensberger’s (1972) 
construction of ‘the deviant as an object of ridicule,’ (p. 23).  The consequence of this is 
relayed via an incident where Danny is upset by children making fun of him. Using reported 
speech and the pronoun, ‘we,’ Harvey reports collective staff reaction, ‘we was explaining… 
they have not seen anyone else ever (-) pushing a trolley that looks like that.’ The pause here 
places emphasis on the word ‘ever,’ which constructs Danny as extremely ‘deviant’, thus 
privileging normalisation over tolerance towards difference and individuality.  It should be 
noted that normalisation, which encourages conventionality, conflicts with freedom of choice 
and emancipatory models such as the social model of disability (Oliver, 1996).  However, 
here it justifies Harvey’s actions to intervene and help Danny avoid social victimisation by 
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explaining that personalisation is acceptable as long as it falls within certain social 
boundaries, ‘I don’t go too far.’   
Nonetheless, there remains a conflict between guiding Danny and facilitating free 
choice.  Indeed, Harvey could have raised the necessity of helping Danny make his own 
decisions (see MCA, 2005).  Instead he explains how Danny has complied with advice but 
that ‘a lot of work was needed to get here.’  Therefore ‘work’ here reinforces Harvey’s 
business or duty of care and responsibility for service-users, giving him a right to influence 
Danny’s choices.  There is also a sense of time involved in persuading, ‘did come through 
through to him in the end,’ and ‘we will get there in the end,’ which constructs Harvey as 
making significant investment and effort in doing a good job as a responsible carer.  
However, his admission of ‘slight progress,’ constructs his efforts as not having had the 
desired effect.  Nevertheless, Harvey’s identity as a facilitator of choices is at stake, and 
given that normalisation and the processes through which it may be achieved has been 
criticised for being controlling (Roos, 1972) (although Harvey himself does not orient to this 
knowledge), constructing outcomes as only partially successful allows Harvey to position 
himself as continuing to respect service-user choices.  Moreover, moderated disapproval, 
evidenced by several disclaimers ‘not that we said it was rubbish but,’ ‘Ok it makes you 
unique!  I mean everyone does that,’ positions Harvey as reasonable, allowing him to manage 
his incompatible positions as someone with a responsibility for Danny and that of facilitating 
his choices.  We also see how he resolves this incompatibility by offering ‘bounded 
empowerment,’ where Danny is allowed to express his individuality, as long as it falls within 
the constraints of normality.   
Having a ‘duty of care’ is a powerful rhetoric in talk, which opens up opportunities 
for intervening in other peoples’ lives.  Here, Harvey and Claire demonstrate an interactional 
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awareness that they have a responsibility to both their duty of care and that of facilitating 
choice, which they manage by simultaneously invoking repertoires resembling normalisation 
to justify guiding service-users. Indeed, practices constructed as only partially successful or 
allowing a ‘bounded empowerment’ and informing service-users of the consequences of their 
actions enables them to resist possible accusations of being controlling or forceful whilst 
nonetheless tailoring service-user behaviour to be more “socially acceptable”.  At no point do 
these speakers refer to more empowering models in care.  In the following example, 
repertoires about ‘safety’ are invoked simultaneously with ‘duty of care’ to justify imposing 
limitations on choice.  
3. Safety, Comparative Evaluations and Normalising Restricted Choice 
The majority of interviewees invoked repertoires about ‘safety’ to argue about choice.  Many 
justified these arguments by performing ‘comparative evaluations’ to argue that restricted 
choice is part of being normal.  Across the data, ‘comparative evaluations’ were often used 
e.g. to argue about how choices could be constrained by one’s daily routines.  These 
discursive strategies resembled social psychological theorisation about social comparison 
processes (e.g. Festinger, 1954), and comparative evaluations (e.g. Mussweiler, 2003) and 
involved speaker claims that the restricted choices of people with learning disabilities were 
comparable to non-disabled individuals.  However, as a discursive strategy here, this allowed 
them to normalise and justify constraints on service-user choice. In the following extract, the 
speaker (Irene) is asked what happens if a service-user who is on medication asks for alcohol. 
Here, she invokes repertoires of ‘safety’ and makes a ‘comparative evaluation’ to defend her 
practice of giving non-alcoholic wine. 
Extract 4 Irene (Lines 344-377 from original transcript) 
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I erm probably get them some wine non-alcoholic wine, 
but it’s still wine type thing. 
R Ummhmm. 
I You know but as long as they were enjoying it, 
that’s all that matters. 
R Yeah.  Have you ever had a situation where you’ve 
had to intervene with client drinking? 
I No 
R No? 
I No, (-) no. 
R Erm in in your in your opinion how does giving the 
client an alternative like a non-alcoholic wine er 
have an effect on the choices they make? 
I Why because you might be giving them a non-alcoholic 
wi[ne and they think  
R   [and 
I it’s an alcoholic wine? 
R Either that or just (-) the fact that they have to 
take an alternative. 
I Erm yeah but then again you see it’s a choice. 
R Umm 
I We offer the choice.  You know erm professionally we 
would be (-) not very responsible if we were if 
somebody were to knock back erm four glasses of wine 
in you know you know and that wouldn’t be good for 
them because of their medical condition and their 
epilepsy. Erm you would obviously er just like a pub 
isn’t it? If someone had too much to drink you would 
find you know you’re not gonna serve them are you? 
R Umm 
I So it’s the same thing isn’t it? (-) (Big) deal 
about it and just sensible with that.  And that 
happens on site and outside, to you and me and to 
everybody so. 
 
Irene explains that she substitutes wine with non-alcoholic wine for service-users on 
medication. Arguably, this immediately removes ‘alcohol’ from the array being offered, an 
action which powerfully defines the choices available.  By drawing on repertoires about 
‘safety,’ Irene’s actions become justified.  Nonetheless, notice the additional work put in, 
emphasising that what is offered still honours service-user choice. After repairing ‘some 
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wine’ to a more specific, ‘non-alcoholic wine,’ Irene stresses, ‘but it’s still wine type thing.’ 
The vagueness of ‘type thing’ glosses her offering as the same as wine. Additionally, by 
stating, ‘but as long as they were enjoying it, that’s all that matters,’ she defines what 
acceptably meets service-user wishes and closes off any room for challenge. Nonetheless, 
following a few turns, the interviewer orients to this substitution, asking ‘how does giving 
the client an alternative like a non-alcoholic wine er have an effect on the choices they 
make?’ Here, Irene addresses both issues of misleading service-users and making 
substitutions but verifies that it is this substitution that gives service-users choice, ‘Erm yeah 
but then again you see it’s a choice,’ ‘we offer the choice.’ Because this is received with 
minimal agreement, she then invokes ‘safety and care’ repertoires, stating ‘professionally we 
would be (-) not very responsible’ to strongly justify intervening as someone responsible for 
the health of service-users  
Irene also provides an extreme analogy of ‘knock(ing) back four glasses of wine,’ 
which if contrasted implicitly against sensible drinking, heightens the irresponsibility of 
professionals who permit this and constructs service-users as lacking capacity to exercise 
restraint with real alcohol.  Also note Irene’s reference to ‘their epilepsy’ here. Given 
epilepsy’s associated safety implications, Irene’s argument becomes increasingly persuasive. 
However, it is important to highlight that the participants in this study were asked to speak 
specifically about service-users with learning disabilities, not epilepsy and though some also 
have epilepsy, this was only a small minority.  Nonetheless, Irene draws on and generalises 
this medical condition as an effective resource for making her argument unchallengeable.  
Next, stating ‘just like a pub isn’t it?’, Irene advances a  ‘comparative evaluation.’  
Drawing on this culturally familiar environment where drinking is legitimised, she argues 
that constraints on drinking can also happen here to non-institutionalised individuals.  In this 
scenario, though the individual in question does not have learning disabilities, Irene makes 
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her comparison relevant by positioning the landlord or employee of the pub as having a 
‘duty of care’ and thus the power to intervene.   Using the pronoun ‘you’ to appeal to her 
audience’s own sense of responsibility, ‘you would find you know you’re not gonna serve 
them are you?’  she then restates the comparison using devices such as a rhetorical question 
(‘So it’s the same thing isn’t it?’), a contrast structure (‘that happens on site and outside’), 
and a three part list (Jefferson, 1990), (‘to you and me and to everybody so’).   
 ‘Comparative evaluations’, therefore allows Irene to convincingly construct 
restrictions on service-user choice as unremarkable by arguing that we can all experience 
constrained choice. However, these arguments are built as unchallengeable by powerfully 
positioning those that offer choice as ‘responsible’ in some way, and, by implication 
(Benwell and Stokoe, 2010), those in receipt of care as irresponsible.  It is also important to 
note that frameworks such as the MCA’s (2005) principle to assume an individual’s capacity 
never enters the register of arguments made here.  When safety is on the agenda, 
presumptions favouring capacity as recommended by the MCA (2005) Code of Practice are 
discarded.    
Discussion 
This analysis examined how support-workers positioned themselves within ‘duty of care’ 
repertoires, simultaneously invoked repertoires about ‘safety’ and ‘normalisation’ and used 
‘comparative evaluations’ as discursive strategies when constructing arguments about 
facilitating the choices and control of service-users with learning disabilities. Repertoires 
about ‘duty of care’ and ‘safety’ provided speakers with powerful positions of granting or 
withholding choice, intervening as responsible carers and constructing service-users as 
lacking capacity.  Repertoires resembling ‘normalisation’ justified practices of influencing 
and persuading service-users to make decisions that staff approved of.  Speakers also invoked 
rhetorical devices e.g. disclaimers, show concessions and contrast structures, to position 
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themselves as facilitators of choice, respecting agendas to empower service-users whilst 
simultaneously intervening in choices.  Additionally, strategies involving ‘comparative 
evaluations,’ allowed speakers to construct limited choice as unremarkable. 
For people relying on specialist services to support their everyday needs, having 
choices even over mundane things presents a daily challenge. Importantly, in research 
evaluating care programmes such as ‘Active Support’ (which prioritises facilitating control 
over choices and activities), significant positive improvements have been found e.g. increased 
adaptive behaviours, decreased challenging behaviours and depression (Beadle-Brown et al, 
2012; Stancliffe et al, 2010).  However, implementation of such programmes has been slow 
(Mansell et al, 2002).  Thus, service-users continue to be disempowered by having to comply 
and fit into existing services, routines and curricula, and even by health-care professionals 
seeking to act in their best interests (Thompson, 2003). 
The MCA (2005) Code of Practice protects the interests of individuals who may lack 
capacity to make their own decisions by stating, in particular, that an individual’s capacity 
should be presumed unless established otherwise, and, that decisions made on behalf of those 
lacking capacity should be done in their ‘best interests.’  However, in this context, speakers 
rarely oriented to this obligation.  Instead, they produced many examples where service-user 
wishes conflicted with what they considered to be safe or normatively acceptable.  This 
supports findings that carers have incompatible responsibilities (see Finlay et al, 2008a), 
which are managed by regulating choice and justified by unmitigated constructions of 
service-users lacking capacity.  Importantly, this also highlights that staff may be unaware of 
the recommendations in the MCA (2005) Code of Practice.  Similar findings are reported in 
studies involving support-workers (Dunn et al, 2010) and even in highly trained professionals 
(Willner et al, 2011), raising a crucial need for there to be more training in issues of capacity 
and decision-making for individuals involved in supporting people with learning disabilities. 
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When not giving or withholding choice, support-workers were also observed using 
strategies to influence decisions.  These were justified by invoking repertoires resembling 
normalisation (Wolfensberger, 1972), which constructed service-users as socially 
inappropriate with negative consequences for integrating into the community. Ostensibly, 
these are important concerns for staff, tasked with empowering service-users in care.  
However, there is a paradox here: by normalising choice and making service-users behave 
appropriately, we are forcing them to change for an unchanging society; a direct contradiction 
of the values espoused by the social model of disability (Oliver, 1996), which locates 
disability in society rather than the individual.  Service-users were also often constructed 
within extreme cases in ways resembling ‘the deviant as an object of ridicule,’ (See 
Wolfensberger, 1972; p. 23).  Staff rarely produced inconsequential examples of facilitating 
control and by describing people with learning disabilities as extremely ‘deviant’, they were 
constructed as gaining greatly from staff interventions to normalise choice.  However, in 
situations where such individuals struggle to ‘fit in,’ these extreme analogies could be 
damaging for facilitating integration.  Such concerns are not unfamiliar.  For example, Ryan 
(2005) explained how mothers of children with learning disabilities often feel ‘pulled in two 
different directions, of wanting their children to ‘fit in’ but, at the same time, realising that 
mainstream life will not, or cannot, accommodate them’ (p.72).  Worryingly, the speakers 
here favoured repertoires resembling normalisation (instead of more emancipatory models), a 
model now largely argued to leave little room for promoting tolerance, in their arguments 
about empowering people with learning disabilities. 
In addition to these less empowering models, speakers were also observed advocating 
practices which involved some compromise and manipulation whilst continuing to position 
themselves as facilitators of choice. For instance, staff described moderating service-user 
choice but constructed this as only a partial accomplishment (see extract 3), thus appearing 
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less controlling.  Another strategy, involved offering ‘bounded empowerment,’ whereby 
service-users were allowed to express individuality as long as it fell within the constraints of 
normality (see Jingree and Finlay’s, 2008 discussion of ‘bounded empowerment’ in support-
worker talk about health and safety).  Support-workers also described presenting service-
users with ‘the consequences’ (see extract 2), where choices were never explicitly refused, 
yet practices encouraged decisions towards what support-workers perceived to be the ‘right’ 
choice.  Thus speakers preserved their positions as facilitators of choice and worked hard to 
argue that first preferences were always considered.  However, free and impartial choice was 
rarely granted. As Dowson (1997) argued, this level of empowerment would not satisfy the 
expectations of ordinary citizens. Relatedly, Simpson (1999) notes, ‘people with learning 
difficulties must demonstrate their competence prior to being granted autonomy.  This is a 
direct inversion of the principle of social intervention which holds for the rest of us’ (p. 154) 
and a breach of the MCA for individuals with capacity. 
Support-workers were also observed making ‘comparative evaluations’ to normalise 
restrictions on service-user choices and construct them as shared by all members of a 
common community.  However, though the choices of ordinary citizens may be constrained 
by factors such as the influence of their friends and family, this is much more widely 
experienced by individuals with learning disabilities (Dowson, 1997).  The risk of storying 
constrained choice as unremarkable must be realised here and that danger is that not only 
could we fail to see and act on the everyday disempowerment experienced by people with 
learning disabilities, we may deny its very existence. 
Constructing ‘duty of care’ and ‘rights and choices’ as a binary is useful for staff 
attempting to push through other institutional agendas e.g. protecting service-users from 
harm, maximising safety, minimising social victimisation and easing integration by 
facilitating “socially acceptable” choices.  Indeed, this provides speakers with the means by 
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which to present themselves as even-handed when proposing unpopular restrictions on 
choice. Simultaneously, it also allows speakers to present themselves as good, responsible 
representatives of services, an appealing attribute with consequences for a service’s standing 
within assessment reports such as those provided by the Care Quality Commission.  Indeed, 
within such guidelines, benchmarks for good quality care and safety are uncompromising 
(see Care Quality Commission, 2010) and fully backed by Government documents promoting 
empowerment, such as the Green Paper ‘Independence, well-being and choice’ (Department 
of Health, 2005), which stresses that ‘social care retains a responsibility for the protection of 
individuals and we do not want to weaken the framework of protection that currently exists’ 
(p. 28).  Is it surprising then, that support-workers struggle to feely facilitate choice, when 
even Government papers present this as incongruous with achieving high standards of care 
and safety.   
This paper hoped to assist support-workers to resolve practical dilemmas and 
establish ways in which to empower people with learning disabilities.  From observations 
made here, it may be useful to alert support-workers of the tendency to minimise genuine 
restrictions on choice, adopt default constructions of service-users as lacking capacity, and 
also of producing extremely ridiculous, deviant examples about service-user decisions, which 
justify arguments about regulating their choices.  Constructions about deviance, incapacity 
and incompetence are familiar (see e.g. Rapley, 2004; Ryan, 2005) and a pattern to be broken 
if we are to see progress with empowerment and integration.  Moreover, it is worth 
recognising that ‘duty of care’ repertoires are powerful, not only in ensuring a good standard 
of care and defining a ‘good’ carer, but, paradoxically also in permitting interference with 
those in receipt of care.  If support-workers adopting a ‘duty of care’ always position 
themselves as granting or withholding choice, they will always be in positions of power. 
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Notes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
i	  ‘People	  with	  learning	  disabilities’	  and	  ‘people	  with	  learning	  difficulties’	  are	  the	  terms	  currently	  used	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  A	  similar	  population	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘people	  with	  intellectual	  disabilities’	  in	  Australia/New	  Zealand,	  and	  the	  USA.	  The	  term	  previously	  used	  in	  the	  UK	  was	  ‘people	  with	  a	  mental	  handicap’.	  
ii	  In	  the	  1970’s,	  when	  introducing	  ideas	  about	  normalisation	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  Wolfensberger	  (1972)	  wrote	  extensively	  about	  what	  he	  called	  deviant	  role	  perception	  to	  describe	  the	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  people	  with	  disabilities	  were	  perceived.	  	  Deviance	  here	  referred	  to	  any	  departures	  from	  what	  was	  considered	  the	  norm.	  	  The	  ‘deviant	  as	  an	  object	  of	  ridicule’	  was	  one	  of	  these	  roles,	  as	  was	  e.g.	  ‘the	  deviant	  as	  holy	  innocent’,	  ‘diseased	  organism’,	  and	  ‘eternal	  child’.	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